Fortune reported that on August 28, Russian troops entered the village of Novohrodivka in eastern Ukraine, just 8 kilometers from Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk is the main target of Russia’s nearly year-long offensive in eastern Ukraine.
The Ukrainian army does not have many reserves to deploy to the Pokrovsk front. Many of the reserve brigades it had a month ago are now taking part in Kiev's surprise attack on Kursk province in Russia.
Ukrainian leaders are finally beginning to realize the urgency of the balance of power on the Pokrovsk axis. "The situation is extremely difficult," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky admitted on August 28.
The upcoming battle for Pokrovsk is essentially an extension of the battle for Avdeevka , which ended in a Ukrainian retreat in February. Avdeevka, 38 km east of Pokrovsk, was a fortress that protected settlements, railways and roads to the west.
When the Ukrainian garrison at Avdeevka ran out of ammunition in mid-February and fled, Russia easily attacked the logistical infrastructure in the west.
Although Russia also suffered and sacrificed a lot to be able to attack Pokrovsk, there was a good reason to do so.
Pokrovsk is located “at a key crossroads of several railway lines,” explains Ukraine’s Frontelligence Insight. “It has become a key rail distribution and delivery hub, facilitating the supply of Ukrainian forces across a wide frontline, from Vuhledar to northern Donetsk and beyond.”
By capturing Pokrovsk, Russia could weaken Ukraine's defenses along the eastern front line - a crucial prerequisite for a broader offensive that would allow Russia to control the entire Donetsk province .
When the Ukrainian command, led by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, decided to attack Kursk with a massive force of thousands of troops drawn from at least eight brigades, some observers wondered why those troops were not left to reinforce Pokrovsk.
A widely accepted interpretation of the Ukrainian strategy in Kursk was that it was aimed at drawing Russian regiments away from the east, relieving pressure on Pokrovsk. In that sense, the Kursk offensive could have been a diversion.
If so, it failed. “Not only did the Kursk offensive fail to prompt the redeployment of some Russian forces from Donetsk, it also exacerbated Ukraine’s shortage of personnel in the region,” the pro-Ukrainian Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) concluded.
Instead of sending its best troops into Kursk to stop the Ukrainian advance, the Kremlin assembled a mixed counterattack force, including many young and poorly trained conscripts. These reinforcements slowed but did not stop the Ukrainian offensive, but allowed Russia to keep its eastern forces intact.
As a result, three weeks after Ukraine stormed Kursk, the Russian offensive in the east not only continued but also gained momentum.
The roughly six Ukrainian brigades defending Pokrovsk are outnumbered about two to one. Without support, they may have no choice but to surrender Pokrovsk – and soon, CIT warns.
