It is necessary to assess the feasibility of jointly operating a 350km/h railway with container freight trains.
Document No. 685/TTr-CP dated October 19, 2024 of the Government on approving the investment policy for the high-speed railway project on the North-South axis (Document) proposes to choose Option 1: "Constructing a new double-track railway line, 1,435 mm gauge, design speed of 350 km/h, load capacity of 22.5 tons/axle for passenger transport, meeting dual-use requirements for national defense and security, and being able to transport goods when necessary; the existing North-South railway transports goods and short-distance tourists".
The State Audit Office believes that, with the decision to choose Option 1, the Government needs to clarify the suitability of this Option with the Conclusion of the Politburo and Resolution No. 55-NQ/TW dated September 20, 2024 of the Central Executive Committee (Resolution No. 55) and handle some shortcomings and inadequacies of this Option.
Specifically, according to the explanation in the Proposal, the transport capacity will only be available after 2035; at the same time, the operating speed will only be 120km/h at night (the actual operating time is only from 22:00 to 6:00). Thus, according to the pre-feasibility study report (FSR), when completed in 2035, the project will not have the capacity to transport goods, including special goods serving national defense and security needs in accordance with the goals and requirements of the Central Executive Committee in Resolution No. 55: "High-speed railway for transporting passengers, meeting dual-use requirements for national defense and security"; "ensuring transport needs on the North-South corridor, which is the largest transport corridor in the country, meeting the requirements of socio-economic development, restructuring the transport market share in accordance with the advantages of each mode, contributing to reducing logistics costs".
Not only that, according to the BCNCTKT, the existing North-South railway will transport goods (heavy goods, bulk goods, liquid goods...); however, in accordance with the above objectives of Resolution No. 55, the high-speed railway must also have the transport capacity to serve security and defense requirements; transport goods, and reduce logistics costs immediately upon project completion.
Furthermore, there is currently no railway line in the world designed with a speed of 350km/h to operate with container trains, so the Ministry of Transport needs to assess the feasibility and risk level of this option...
The State Audit Office also believes that it is necessary to ensure the synchronization, unity, and connectivity, domestically and internationally, of newly invested railway projects with a railway gauge of 1,435mm with railway lines currently operating using "old" technology at a speed of 150-200km/h. If interconnection is not possible, will it affect the effectiveness of the remaining projects as well as the overall effectiveness of the railway system that will be newly invested in and built according to the plan until 2045?
Carefully evaluate the ability to recover capital on high-speed railway lines
According to the Financial Statement, the Project is economically efficient (EIRR 12.4%; benefit/cost ratio (B/C) 1.06; net present value (NPV) 9.143 billion USD; capital recovery potential within 33.61-41.18 years). However, the Financial Statement has not mentioned some risks and trends that may impact the project's future development revenue, thereby affecting the project's economic efficiency, specifically:
Regarding the demand for rail transport by 2050, the BCNCTKT has not calculated the future travel trend, specifically: In the current period, along with the development of the 4.0 scientific and technological revolution, e-commerce is growing at a very high speed, commercial transactions, negotiations, dialogues, meetings, learning... are carried out on digital platforms, reducing the travel demand of about 50% of the number of passengers and reducing the travel demand of people. Therefore, the Ministry of Transport needs to recalculate the travel demand of passengers compared to the estimate in the Report.
Regarding the ticket price used as the basis for determining the development revenue of the Project, according to the State Audit Office, of the total number of forecasted passengers (122.7 million/year), the number of passengers traveling directly from the beginning to the end station (Hanoi - Ho Chi Minh City and vice versa) only accounts for a certain proportion. Therefore, if the total amount of revenue is divided by the total number of passengers, the average ticket price/passenger will be much lower than the ticket price for the entire route (the average may be only 30-40% of the expected ticket price in the Proposal). In other words, the actual revenue will not be as expected.
From the above reasons, the State Audit Office believes that it is necessary to recalculate the ability to recover investment capital for transport business activities on this railway line, as well as the ability of the state budget to compensate for losses (in China and Japan, each country has only 2 profitable high-speed passenger railway lines, the state budget must compensate for losses for the remaining lines).
The National Assembly considers and approves a resolution on investment policies for important national projects.
The State Audit Office proposes to consider and consider the proposal for the authority to decide on adjusting the investment policy and adjusting the Project in the Submission: Clause 5, Article 19 of the Law on Public Investment stipulates that "The National Assembly considers and approves resolutions on investment policies for national target programs and important national projects. The main contents of the resolution include: objectives, scale, total investment capital, main technology, location, time, implementation progress, mechanisms and solutions, and implementation policies".
The main contents of the resolution on investment policy (core, important contents that directly affect the project) must be reported to the National Assembly for decision on adjustment according to authority.
On the other hand, the project is large-scale, has complex technical technology, long implementation time, and is being implemented for the first time in the country, so it needs to be carefully researched and considered, and changes to some approved contents in the investment policy decision and project investment decision should be minimized.
Regarding site clearance and land acquisition, according to the State Audit Office, it is necessary to develop a separate compensation, support and resettlement policy framework for the Project and submit it to the National Assembly for approval to have a legal basis for synchronous and consistent implementation among localities where this railway line passes through, and this work should be deployed simultaneously on the entire route right from phase 1 of the project.
The division of project components should be determined right at the stage of approving the investment policy to have a basis for developing an early implementation plan, ensuring the completion of the entire project by 2035.
In addition, the State Audit also pointed out difficulties in localization. Currently, the Vietnamese railway industry can only produce sleepers and railway cars of 1,000 mm gauge with a speed of less than 120 km/h, leading to the localization of railway technology with a speed of 350 km/h being unfeasible and difficult in organizing, implementing, operating and maintaining the project. Meanwhile, currently only 4 countries have exclusive ownership of technology with a speed of 350 km/h. Currently, China only transfers technology to Thailand with a railway speed of 200 km/h - 250 km/h. In addition, the State Audit also gave opinions on issues such as capital sources for the project and project implementation progress.
