First, the EU uses legal tools to require businesses in the bloc not to be too dependent on an external supply source. Accordingly, each business is only allowed to meet a maximum of 30-40% of the demand for a type of strategically important raw material from a partner; and must have two to three suppliers from different countries.
The main goal of this orientation is to reduce dependence on a single partner, thereby better controlling risks arising from monopoly or supply control.
Second, the EU plans to spend 3 billion Euros to develop the industry of manufacturing and processing strategic raw materials in the EU. In fact, the EU's purpose here is to create its own supply sources, gradually strengthening self-reliance and autonomy in supplying strategic raw materials so that in the near future it can completely no longer depend on any external suppliers.
Third, the EU advocates establishing a network of partnerships in this field with external partners. This orientation is actually not new because many other countries in the world have proposed and implemented it at many levels and in many different forms.
Looking at both the nature and the phenomenon, the above policy orientations of the EU are a deep and thorough supply chain reform never seen before in the history of the EU. External factors play a very decisive role, forcing the EU to both worry ahead and respond closely. Ensuring security in the supply chain by reducing the level of dependence on external supply, especially strategic materials, is a very timely approach. Reducing risks like this also helps the EU increase its position in strategic competition with major partners in the world.
This orientation is correct, but whether the EU achieves its goals depends on three factors: Whether it can take advantage of the time to adjust the supply chain, whether it has enough resources to bear the cost of transition, and whether it has enough diplomatic capacity to persuade external partners to participate.
