Spreading fake news, creating a "crowd effect" on social networks to sabotage elections
A common trick before each election of National Assembly deputies (NA deputies) and People's Council deputies (PE deputies) at all levels is the dissection and distortion of data on the deputy structure of hostile forces and political opportunists. From there, they make inferences that elections are only formalistic, intentionally giving one-sided figures and then attributing that the selection of deputies has been predetermined, while ignoring the entire election process according to legal regulations. This false information aims to sow suspicion in society and deny the democracy of election activities in our country.
Reality shows that the process of introducing candidates for National Assembly deputies and People's Council deputies in Vietnam is carried out strictly, publicly and democratically. In this election, the process of introducing personnel is stipulated in the Law on Election of National Assembly deputies and People's Council deputies, and is also specifically guided in Joint Resolution No. 102/2025/NQLT-UBTVQH15-CP-ĐCTUBTWMTTQVN dated September 26, 2025 of the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Government and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front on guiding the process of consultation and introduction of candidates for National Assembly deputies of the 16th term and People's Council deputies at all levels for the 2026-2031 term.
According to regulations and practical implementation, the introduction of candidates must go through many steps and many rounds of consultation with the participation of the Fatherland Front, socio-political organizations and voters.
Candidates are checked for standards, and at the same time, opinions and confidences from voters at their place of residence and workplace must be obtained before making the official list. This process ensures publicity, democracy, and creates conditions for voters to select typical delegates in terms of qualities, capacity and prestige.
A trick often used by hostile forces and political opportunists is to take advantage of cyberspace to distort and fabricate in order to undermine the prestige of those introduced to run for National Assembly deputies and People's Council deputies at all levels. Instead of refuting based on objective information, these subjects spread false content, intentionally inferring and accusing about the personal background, working process and personal life of candidates in order to create suspicion in public opinion.
In general, this information is often spread in the form of anonymous comments, articles of unclear proven sources but presented in a sensational way, easily attracting attention. When false content is shared repeatedly on many accounts, they easily create a feeling as "common information", thereby negatively impacting the perception of a part of the recipient.
Besides direct forms of distortion, spreading fake news on social networks is becoming a common trick to sabotage election activities. They take advantage of the spreading mechanism of social network algorithms to amplify false information, creating a "crowd effect", making it easy for a part of the recipients to mistakenly believe that suspicion about elections is common in society.
The ultimate goal is to sow skepticism, reduce voters' confidence in the election process and political institutions, thereby disrupting the information environment and negatively impacting social awareness, especially in the period before important political events.
Proactively fighting and refuting distorted election arguments in cyberspace
Therefore, proactively identifying, fighting and promptly refuting wrong and hostile views is an urgent requirement.
First of all, it is necessary to strengthen information and official propaganda about elections in a timely, complete and transparent manner. Providing information quickly, accurately and easily accessible also contributes to limiting information gaps, which are often exploited by anti-government elements to spread fake news.
Second, it is necessary to proactively detect and promptly refute false information in cyberspace. The refutation needs to be carried out in the spirit of objectivity, persuasion, based on scientific and practical arguments, thereby helping readers understand the nature of the problem and avoid being led by unverified information.
Third, it is necessary to raise awareness and "information resistance" for officials, party members and voters. In the context of strong social network development, each Internet user needs to be equipped with skills to recognize fake news, and the habit of verifying information sources before receiving and sharing information. Especially content created by artificial intelligence (AI). When the community has better ability to analyze and filter information, distorted arguments will find it difficult to spread and impact social awareness.
Fourth, besides the role of functional agencies and the mainstream press, the social responsibility of influential individuals on social networks (KOLs) also needs to be promoted.
